Free Speech and Intellectual Values by Bollinger, Lee C
Free Speech and Intellectual Values
Lee C. Bollinger t
In the preface to his book, The Negro and the First Amendment,'
Harry Kalven observed that the idea of free speech was marked by an
unusually keen "quest for coherent general theory."'2 Every area of the
law, Kalven puzzled, was rife with inconsistency and ambiguity, yet inex-
plicably there was little tolerance for anomalies in the field of free speech.,
As to why this was so, Kalven speculated that "free speech is so close to
the heart of democratic organization that if we do not have an appropriate
theory for our law here, we feel we really do not understand the society in
which we live.""
With New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,' Kalven believed that a "coher-
ent general theory" had finally been reached.6 In Kalven's view, Justice
Brennan's opinion for the Court had for the first time provided our free
speech jurisprudence with a "central meaning," identifying a core func-
tion of free speech rather than simply repeating, as the cases had so often
done, the theoretically empty "clear and present danger" test of Holmes.
Kalven thought the Court was in essence pursuing a theory put forward
by Alexander Meiklejohn in the late 1940's,' and, though the Sullivan
t Professor of Law, University of Michigan.
1. H. KALVEN, THE NEGRO AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT (1965).
2. Id. at 4.
3. Kalven noted:
My inquiry is into the impact of the Negro issue on free-speech theory. It presupposes agree-
ment that the quest for coherent general theory in matters of the First Amendment needs no
apology and no defense. Yet there is a puzzle here. In general, the law has a great capacity to
tolerate inconsistencies; perhaps the most difficult thing for the beginning law student to grasp
is this sense of tolerable inconsistency . . . . To take a page from torts for the moment, if I
were to say that my purpose was to struggle with a liability theory that has one basis of
liability for industrial accidents and another for non-industrial accidents, or that has one basis
for liability in defamation and another for physical harms, you would think I was a purist
with unreasonable expectations of generality. When, however, it is, as it will be, a question of
fitting control of defamation or obscenity or contempt of court into free-speech notions, we
accept the challenge as proper.
Id. at 4-5.
4. Id. at 6.
5. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
6. Kalven, The New York Times Case: A Note on "The Central Meaning of the First Amend-
ment," 1964 SUP. CT. REV. 191.
7. Id. at 213-14.
8. See A. MEIKLEJOHN, Free Speech and Its Relation to Self-Government, in POLITICAL FREE-
DOM: THE CONSTITUTIONAL POWERS OF THE PEOPLE 3 (1960). Kalven commented:
It is not easy to predict what the Court will see in the Times opinion as the years roll by. It
may regard the opinion as covering simply one pocket of cases, those dealing with libel of
public officials, and not destructive of the earlier notions that are inconsistent only with the
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opinion nowhere mentioned Meiklejohn or his work, Justice Brennan
later subtly agreed with Kalven's attribution.'
This triumvirate of New York Times v. Sullivan, Harry Kalven, and
Alexander Meiklejohn, which was formed in the mid-1960's, spawned a
way of thinking and talking about freedom of speech and press that quick-
ly came to dominate public discourse and continues to do so today.
Meiklejohn became the cardinal theorist of this understanding. Many who
came after professed to be following in his path. Professor Bork, for ex-
ample, began his work on the First Amendment with a statement of gen-
eral allegiance to Meiklejohn's interpretation,'0 while Professor Bickel
claimed to be a member of this tradition in The Morality of Consent." As
I shall show, it is debatable whether these self-proclaimed disciples were
true to the faith. At this juncture, I shall confine myself to the observation
that Sullivan initiated a major theoretical and idiomatic avalanche, which
Meiklejohn was thought to have precipitated.
The essential elements of the Sullivan-Kalven-Meiklejohn paradigm
are often difficult to identify. At least two principal themes, however, do
appear to emerge from these writings. The first is the notion that the
primary function of speech and press is to advance the processes of self-
government. The First Amendment must be aligned with the preexisting
societal choice of a democratic form of government; it derives its function
and legitimacy from serving the process of self-government. And it does
this primarily by standing guard against attempts by government to inter-
fere in the self-governing process. The second major theme is the idea that
the ultimate aim of the First Amendment is the advancement of the public
or collective good and not that of any single individual.
The Sullivan conception of free speech spread through the cases and
literature like a grass fire in mid-August. As a result, the First Amend-
ment has become a process-oriented concept, one with all the power and
legitimacy of a systemic imperative. Illustrative of this position is Justice
Stewart's well-known speech in which he attempts to deal with the prob-
larger reading of the Court's action. But the invitation to follow a dialectic progression from
public official to government policy to public policy to matters in the public domain, like art,
seems to me to be overwhelming. If the Court accepts the invitation, it will slowly work out for
itself the theory of free speech that Alexander Meiklejohn has been offering us for some fifteen
years now.
Kalven, supra note 6, at 221.
9. See Brennan, The Supreme Court and the Meiklejohn Interpretation of the First Amendment,
79 HARV. L. REV. 1, 11-19 (1965).
10. See Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1, 26
(1971). Professor Bork disagreed with the sweep of protection that Meiklejohn and Kalven would
extend under a self-government theory of free speech; he proposed limiting protection to speech that
was explicitly "political" in character. Id.
11. See A. BICKEL, THE MORALITY OF CONSENT 62 (1975).
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lem of setting limits on the First Amendment rights of the press.' 2 He
envisions the press as a part of the overall system of checks and balances
on institutional power, helping to insure the preservation of democracy.
Justice Brennan's concurring opinion in the Richmond Newspapers case
13
offers another illustration:
But the First Amendment embodies more than a commitment to free
expression and a communicative interchange for their own sakes; it
has a structural role to play in securing and fostering our republican
system of self-government. Implicit in this structural role is not only
"the principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited,
robust, and wide-open," but also the antecedent assumption that val-
uable public debate-as well as other civic behavior-must be in-
formed. The structural model links the First Amendment to that
process of communication necessary for a democracy to survive, and
thus entails solicitude not only for communication itself, but also for
the indispensable conditions of meaningful communication. 4
Here, as with Stewart's perspective, the analysis of the boundaries and
meaning of the First Amendment is demarcated by talk of limiting politi-
cal power, by checks and balances, and by arguments for the creation of
the efficient flow of information necessary for democracy to function. This
is the method of discourse so powerfully initiated by the Sullivan decision.
Despite its dominance, the Sullivan idiom has met with a growing un-
dercurrent of dissatisfaction. 5 The objections commonly offered seem to
be of two varieties. One concern is .that linking the First Amendment with
12. See Stewart, Or of the Press, 26 HASTINGS L.J. 631, 633-34 (1975) ("[T]he Free Press guar-
antee is, in essence, a structural provision of the Constitution . . . . The primary purpose of the
constitutional guarantee of a free press was. . . to create a fourth institution outside the Government
as an additional check on the three official branches."); see also Address by William J. Brennan, Jr.,
32 RUTGERS L. REV. 173, 176 (1979) ("The First Amendment protects the structure of communica-
tion necessary for the existence of our democracy.").
13. Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555 (1980).
14. Id. at 587-88 (Brennan, J., concurring) (citations and footnotes omitted).
15. Professor Tribe, for example, urges a more balanced view of the "purposes" of the First
Amendment, claiming that the "instrumentalist" vision of free speech, which sees free speech as a
means to a systemic end, whether it be truth generally or good political decisions, fails to recognize
that liberty of speech is also an end in itself. Speech, in this latter view, permits each individual the
meaningful freedom to express himself as he feels the need to do so: "What, finally, of speech as an
expression of self? As a cry of impulse no less than as a dispassionate contribution to intellectual
dialogue?" L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 12-1, at 577 (1978). He adds: "More gen-
erally, it must be said that Meiklejohn's conception of the First Amendment, and Holmes', were both
far too focused on intellect and rationality to accommodate the emotive role of free expression-its
place in the evolution, definition, and proclamation of individual and group identity." Id. at 578; see
also B. SCHMIDT, FREEDOM OF THE PRESS V. PUBLIC ACCESS 31-36 (1976) ("[T]he tradition of the
First Amendment. . . definets] a scope for the Amendment that is not instrumental, not designed to
shape the political process, and not a policy of efficiency in democratic self-governance."); Dworkin, Is
the Press Losing the First Amendment?, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, Dec. 4, 1980, at 49, 55-56 (discussing
whether free speech is directed toward protection of the speaker or the listener).
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the system of self-government will yield a theory of protection that is too
narrow in scope.16 Along this line, some argue that if only the speech
needed for political decisionmaking is protected, other speech, equally
worthy of protection when measured on a scale of general importance to
society, will then be suppressed. Alternatively, others argue that even
speech that cannot necessarily be said to be in the public interest should
be sheltered against censorship.
17
The second critique of the linkage between the First Amendment and
the public interest in self-government expresses concern about that link's
stability. Some have worried about the possibilities for manipulation, or
cowardice in the face of manipulation, when the scope for protection is
based on such an indeterminate concept as the public interest. Or it may
be feared that thinking about free speech in such general terms may lead
people to accede more readily to that persistent temptation to tinker with
First Amendment rights on some disingenuous notion that systemic needs
either no longer make it possible to accommodate those rights or permit
only a much modified version of them. 8
16. See L. TRIBE, supra note 15, § 12-1.
17. Discussing the cases involving the rights of the press under the First Amendment, Dworkin
says that the "dominant theory among American constitutional lawyers assumes that the constitutional
rights of free speech-including free press ... are directed at protecting the audience." Dworkin,
supra note 15, at 51. Such a theory, he observes, is generally defended on the ground of "policy":
They argue, that is, that a reporter must have certain powers, not because he or anyone else is
entitled to any special protection, but in order to secure some general benefit to the community
as a whole, just as farmers must sometimes have certain subsidies, not for their own sakes, but
also to secure some benefit for the community.
Id. Dworkin objects that "[i]f free speech is justified as a matter of policy, then whenever a decision is
to be made about whether free speech requires some further exception or privilege, competing dimen-
sions of the public's interest must be balanced against its interest in information." Id. at 52. He says:
Suppose the question arises ... whether the Freedom of Information Act should be amended
so that the Disease Control Center is not required to make its reports available to reporters, or
whether the Atomic Energy Commission should be allowed to enjoin a magazine from publish-
ing an article that might make atomic information more readily available to foreign powers.
In both cases the "public's general interest" cuts in two directions, in "being well informed" and in
having "infection-free hospitals" and "atomic security." This means that a "cost-benefit analysis"
must be introduced, and it may well be decided that "in the long term (and taking side effects into
account) the public would lose more overall if the information in question were published." "Then,"
Dworkin concludes with unexceptionable logic, after having defined "interest" as encompassing only
an interest in being well informed, "it would be self-contradictory to argue that it must be published
in the public's interest, and the argument for free speech, on grounds of policy, would be defeated."
Id.
Professor Tribe advances another objection to the self-government rationale. Such a rationale, he
says, really only provides an intermediate purpose for the First Amendment, one that leads ultimately
to an individual autonomy or self-realization goal. If you ask why self-government should be valued,
the common answer will be "that political participation is valuable in part because it enhances per-
sonal growth and self-realization." L. TRIBE, supra note 15, § 12-1, at 578.
18. These kinds of concerns have developed especially in two areas of the First Amendment:
broadcast regulation, where a public interest approach has been particularly prominent in upholding
government regulation; and press access, where it has been argued that the press should be accorded
certain special First Amendment rights on the ground that such rights would advance the public
interest. See Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 386-401 (1967) (broadcasters have
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Any critic, of course, must supply an alternative vision. Typically, the
competing theory involves some variation on the theme of free speech as
the protector of the individual interest, defined in terms such as "self-
realization," or "autonomy," or inherent rights of equal political partici-
pation.1" A few cases, like Cohen v. California,20 and a few judicial opin-
ions, like Justice Brandeis' concurrence in Whitney v. California,21 are
frequently cited as speaking to this alternative notion of the root principle
of the First Amendment.22
I share the feelings of uneasiness about the dominant systemic perspec-
tive, although I do not believe that the individual rights or autonomy per-
spective provides an entirely satisfactory alternative for explaining what is
done in the name of free speech. Often, the rights perspective seems to be
simply a way of avoiding having to explain why particular speech activi-
ties ought to receive protection; as such it is both unhelpful as a method of
solving the practical questions with which the First Amendment must
grapple, and unlikely to prove durable.23 When reasons are given to sup-
affirmative duty to present both sides of political issues and to allow responses to personal attacks);
Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 141-44 (1973) (Stewart,
J., concurring) (discussing "public interest" in broadcast regulation); Lewis, A Preferred Position for
Journalism?, 7 HOFSTRA L. REv. 595 (1979) (considering claims for preferential status for the press).
19. See L. TRIBE, supra note 15, § 12-1. Dworkin argues for a view of free speech as protecting
the rights of the speaker against any of several possible harms of censorship, a theory premised on the
belief
that censorship is degrading because it suggests that the speaker or writer is not worthy of
equal concern as a citizen, or that his ideas are not worthy of equal respect; that censorship is
insulting because it denies the speaker an equal voice in politics and therefore denies his stand-
ing as a free and equal citizen; or that censorship is grave because it inhibits an individual's
development of his own personality and integrity.
Dworkin, supra note 15, at 51; see also Scanlon, A Theory of Freedom of Expression, 1 PHIL. & PUB.
AFF. 204, 215-20 (1972) (extrapolating from Meiklejohn that our interest in autonomy mandates
restricting government from forbidding speech merely because citizenry might come to believe ideas
expressed).
20. 403 U.S. 15 (1971).
21. 274 U.S. 357, 372 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
22. Justice Harlan's opinion for the Court in Cohen is the most famous of such decisions:
The constitutional right of free expression is powerful medicine in a society as diverse and
populous as ours. It is designed and intended to remove governmental restraints from the arena
of public discussion, putting the decision as to what views shall be voiced largely into the hands
of each of us, in the hope that use of such freedom will ultimately produce a more capable
citizenry and more perfect polity and in the belief that no other approach would comport with
the premise of individual dignity and choice upon which our political system rests.
403 U.S. at 24. Another opinion thought to be in this vein is Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per
curiam). See also Polsby, Buckley v. Valeo: The Special Nature of Political Speech, 1976 SUP. CT.
REV. 1, 13-14 (interpreting Buckley v. Valeo as embracing "individual right" perspective of First
Amendment).
23. Zechariah Chafee captured the difficulty of thinking exclusively in terms of rights:
[I]t is useless to define free speech by talk about rights. The agitator asserts his constitu-
tional right to speak, the government asserts its constitutional right to wage war. The result is
a deadlock. Each side takes the position of the man who was arrested for swinging his arms
and hitting another in the nose, and asked the judge if he did not have a right to swing his
arms in a free country. "Your right to swing your arms ends just where the other man's nose
begins." To find the boundary line of any right, we must get behind rules of law to human
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port a rights analysis it is usually said that the interests of the speaker are
sufficiently great that the society ought to let him proceed undisturbed.
Such an argument, however, is just another way of saying that the com-
munity is better off by the speech being protected, because to do what is
right is to be better off. The real dispute, therefore, is over the definition
of the best interests of the society, rather than whether the First Amend-
ment should seek to augment either the public or the individual interest.2
The problem with the collective good approach to-free speech, however,
is not with the effort to justify and explain free speech as benefiting soci-
facts. In our problem, we must regard the desires and needs of the individual human being
who wants to speak and those of the great group of human beings among whom he speaks.
That is, in technical language, there are individual interests and social interests, which must be
balanced against each other, if they conflict, in order to determine which interest shall be
sacrificed under the circumstances and which shall be protected and become the foundation of
a legal right. It must never be forgotten that the balancing cannot be properly done unless all
the interests involved are adequately ascertained, and the great evil of all this talk about rights
is that each side is so busy denying the other's claim to rights that it entirely overlooks the
human desires and needs behind that claim.
Z. CHAFEE, FREE SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATES 31-32 (1941) (footnote omitted).
24. The central question asked in this essay is, "How do we benefit from tolerating speech?" The
conventional response would be to say that the benefit comes in the form of receiving new, or addi-
tional, information and ideas. This is how Dworkin characterizes it in his critique of the public
interest approach to free speech. See supra note 17. Dworkin proposes a speaker's rights analysis:
[A]ny conflict between free speech and the public's welfare is not a pseudo conflict between
two aspects of the public's interest that may be dissolved in some judgment of its overall inter-
est. It is a genuine conflict between the rights of a particular speaker as an individual and the
competing interests of the community as a whole. Unless that competing interest is very
great-unless publication threatens some emergency or other grave risk-the individual's right
must outweigh the social interest, because that is what it means to suppose that he has this sort
of right.
Dworkin, supra note 15, at 52. There are two principal problems with this analysis. The first is that
it begs the questions of why the interest of the speaker should be accorded such a preeminent status.
Only by labeling speech a "right," and then defining "rights" as taking precedence over competing
social interests, is the result reached. The second problem concerns the assumption that a speaker's
rights perspective, based on "principle," is desirable because it avoids the problem of thinking about
how society will benefit by the protection of the speech. The court is advised to tally up the interests
on each side, the community interest being defined generally as the harm that will arise from the
speech, and the speaker's interest being the possession of an "equal voice," and then decide which is
greater, holding its thumb on the free speech side of the scale. To conceive of First Amendment
analysis in this way, however, is to limit unnecessarily one's vision of the role that the Amendment
plays in society. To understand how society is better off by having a First Amendment does not mean,
as Dworkin suggests, that the inquiry should be limited to an examination in the particular case of
the practical benefits to be derived from the information offered by this speaker. To think in those
limited, narrow terms is to restrict the meaning of an idea to its particular applications, and to limit
the function of tolerating speech to that of preserving the flow of data. The benefits for the society in
having an area of social life in which toleration is insisted upon, even to an extreme degree, can
reasonably be thought to transcend the simple benefits of information. It is not uncommon in human
behavior to run unusual levels of risk for other purposes beyond those involved in the discrete area in
which the activity is undertaken.
The purpose of this Article is to begin to examine just what those broader societal benefits are
thought to be. Understanding why speech is valuable to those engaged in it is an important inquiry,
but understanding why people should be tolerant of those who seek those values is even more impor-
tant; in fact, it is imperative for developing a viable First Amendment theory. The problem, therefore,
is not whether reasons should be given but what reasons should be given-and, in that inquiry, we
must not limit our perspective to "benefits" narrowly defined in terms of information flow.
The Yale Law Journal
ety, but rather with its unnecessarily limited vision of what that larger
benefit or social function is. For all the grandeur of its tone and language,
the structural or public interest perspective of the First Amendment can
offer a remarkably limited view of the role and function the concept plays
in the general life of the society and in the minds of judges and others who
enforce and write about it. It speaks usually in the language of pragma-
tism and rational thought; its focus purports to be on the flow and distri-
bution of information, whether it be for truth-seeking generally or for
political decisionmaking. Maximization of information and ideas for the
society is said to be the primary aim.
The individual autonomy or speaker's rights perspective, which has so
frequently objected to the limited purview of the instrumentalist perspec-
tive, has failed to generate accurate criticisms of that form of anlaysis. For
example, the argument that the systemic perspective is inadequate because
it does not protect speech that is socially but not necessarily politically
significant, like literature and art generally, does not respond to the posi-
tion of some purported systemic theorists that all such speech can be com-
fortably included within the domain of the politically relevant. Meiklejohn
himself, when attacked for proposing a theory too narrow in compass,
responded with just such a generous interpretation of his own argu-
ments.25 Meiklejohn's answer has never seemed wholly satisfying for
many people, but the reason it has proved unconvincing has nothing to do
with its inherent improbability. In fact, it is entirely possible to conceive
of a richly protective First Amendment that is exclusively tied to the pro-
cess of democracy.
What is troublesome is the self-definition, the identity, implicit in the
systemic theory itself. Free speech is not just a practical tool for making
systemic repairs, but an affirmation or statement of what we value as a
people. To define ourselves exclusively in terms of our political functions,
however important they may be to us, is too limited a self-conception,
even if all the forms of expression we value can be brought within the
First Amendment sphere under the political speech designation. The rea-
son we shelter speech is as important as the speech we shelter.
This tendency to ground criticism of the public interest perspective in
claims about the scope of the free speech concept is symptomatic of a gen-
eral inability or reluctance to take a larger view of the role played by the
First Amendment in social life. An individualist perspective, which pur-
ports to remove from First Amendment analysis any consideration of the
societal benefits derived from having such a constitutional concept, is quite
unsatisfactory. What is needed is not an avoidance of consideration of the
25. See Meiklejohn, The First Amendment Is an Absolute, 1961 SUP. CT. REV. 245, 263.
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societal role played by the idea of free speech but rather a redefinition, an
enlargement, of the analysis of what that role is or purports to be. As
presently conceived, however, the "self-government, public good" account
of free speech is lacking in both explanatory and prescriptive power. It is
but a patina, an epiphenomenon, beneath which deeper and more complex
issues are being raised and addressed.
But what are those deeper and more complex issues? In this essay, I
shall refer a great deal to what I shall call, for want of a better name,
"intellectual values." I simply mean to inquire into how we are told to
think about beliefs and ideas, and into the relationship we ought to strive
for as we set about deciding questions of importance and dealing with
conflicts within the society. The subject of this essay could just as well be
put in terms of learning controls on the use of power, for the focus is on
understanding not why speech is valued but why tolerance of it is de-
manded, a distinction in framing the inquiry into the social functions of
the concept of free speech that I believe has important substantive
connotations.
I will suggest that much of what we encounter in discourse about the
First Amendment is really about fundamental intellectual values. Free
speech is not just about getting more information and ideas needed to
make good decisions, nor just about having the freedom to express our-
selves as we see fit, but more importantly, and more broadly, about how to
think, about such matters as our beliefs and about the fears and angers we
bear towards the contrary beliefs and behavior of others. Refocusing our
inquiry onto the question of how to think about information and
ideas-an epistemological inquiry-will prove helpful in arriving at a
general theory of the First Amendment.26
Our inquiry, in one sense, may be correctly described as intermediate.
It avoids the dispute over whether the ultimate end of freedom of speech is
a new vaccine, a better social security system, or a more fulfilled popula-
tion. It focuses instead on the intellectual attributes people bring to the
enterprise of truth-seeking, self-governance, or self-realization. It is also
the case, however, that in this process we can see the glimmering of other
ends and the beginnings of a foundation for a general theory.
The essay focuses briefly on the thought of two principal First Amend-
ment theorists, Alexander Meiklejohn and Oliver Wendell Holmes. For
several reasons the major emphasis is on Meiklejohn's theory. First, the
intellectual values underlying Holmes' work on the First Amendment are
much better known and much more congenial to our notions of what free
26. Much of the analysis that follows builds upon an earlier essay. See Bollinger, The Skokie
Legacy: Reflections on an "Easy Case" and Free Speech Theory (Book Review), 80 MICH. L. REV.
617 (1982).
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speech means. Second, Meiklejohn seems to represent for us a more con-
temporary description or defense of the meaning of free speech and, thus,
provides an image that is more currently significant. And, third, not only
is Meiklejohn's work ultimately more novel and perhaps infused with
greater contemporary significance, but it also is more revealing than that
of other theorists.
In each case, however, the questions will be the same. What form of
intellectual values is being recommended to those contemplating suppres-
sion of speech? What are the consequences to them in embracing those
values? The problem is not to discern whether the theorist is arguing that
freedom of speech seeks to protect the interest of each individual to speak,
or the needs of self-government, or the search for truth, but instead to ask
more generally about the intellectual outlook that is being advanced. The
object is to locate the dispute between two major theorists and to speculate
as to what consequences for a concept of free speech are generated by
their competing visions. The general inquiry is presented as exemplary of
the type of perspective that might be followed in thinking about freedom
of speech. It also seeks to identify a major underlying conflict that reso-
nates throughout the jurisprudence of the First Amendment. Indeed, the
essay offers a hypothesis to account, at least partially, for why no general
theory has emerged from this major set of writings.
Many elements of the perspective advocated in this essay will be
presented as the argument is developed, but it may be useful to offer an
introduction. First, it is desirable to move beyond the simple notion that
the sole function of free speech is to protect "the people" from interference
in their speech activities by the government. My point is not that there is
no longer a risk that the government may seek to usurp free speech rights
needed for self-government; the Pentagon Papers case17 suggests the con-
trary. Rather, I believe that this perspective is seriously incomplete. In
contemporary America, restrictions on free speech are more frequently the
product of democracy in action than officialdom seeking to regain preroga-
tives of the royal sovereign. It is necessary to escape the beguiling illusion
that the battle against a despotic regime is still the exclusive war to be
waged.
Next, it is important to avoid defining the value of the idea of free
speech in terms of the activity of expression itself. It is still common to
hear the explanation that speech activities of those wanting to be intoler-
ant will be better secured if unpopular speech is protected. 8 I do not
claim that there is nothing to this type of argument. Rather, I claim that
27. New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971).
28. See infra note 46.
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it is overused and that this overuse is suggestive of a general tendency to
think about the function of free speech exclusively in terms of protecting
our interest in preserving activity of speaking (or our interest in being free
to listen to speech we wish to hear). When the argument for protection
does turn to identifying other "benefits" for those seeking intolerance, the
typical claim for free speech is that it guarantees the supply of informa-
tion and ideas for decisionmaking. Such a perspective, however, is too nar-
row in two different ways. First, it offers an unfortunately quarantined
vision of the benefits people may derive from tolerating that which they
are disinclined to tolerate (perhaps even for good reason). It tends to view
those benefits narrowly in terms of practical gains, rather than in terms of
remedying some inherent and fundamental problem that happens to reveal
itself in the context of intolerance towards speech activities. Second, it is
part of an attempt to isolate the benefits of free speech to those that arise
from the act of speaking or of expression (in contrast, say, to those that
might arise from nonexpressive behavior), rather than to envision its aim
as that of addressing a problem or issue of universal importance in human
affairs by advancing remedies of equally wide significance.
With these general changes in perspective in mind, the analyses of free
speech by Meiklejohn and Holmes can be considered.
I.
Meiklejohn's essay is a curious and deceptive work. While the line of
argument seems simple to follow, the reader often feels that some-
thing-some other argument or set of arguments-is being missed. The
essay is even more puzzling to view as a "great" piece of First Amend-
ment writing because so much of it crumbles on slightest handling, lead-
ing one to believe that it cannot be logic that accounts for its success. The
message and power of the essay are elusive.
A conventional reading of Meiklejohn would cite him for advancing the
fundamental proposition that, in a society that has chosen to be self-gov-
erning, the government cannot label some information as too dangerous or
wrong for that society to hear. To permit such censorship is to negate the
original premise of self-government, because to be self-governing a citi-
zenry must have the information and ideas necessary for decisionmaking.
Hence, Meiklejohn is noted for arguing that the meaning of free speech
must be that all speech relating to the process of self-governance is "abso-
lutely" protected against governmental suppression.
Two other corollaries to Meiklejohn's major thesis are well known and
commonly mentioned. The first is the claim that the First Amendment
protects only speech relevant to the process of self-government, the re-
mainder being relegated to the reduced protections of the due process
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clause of the Fifth Amendment.2" His working concepts for these different
categories of speech are what he called "public" and "private" speech.
Public speech is that used by people to plan together for the general wel-
fare. Private speech has a more selfish motivation behind it and is not
directed at solving public issues: "There are, then, in the theory of the
Constitution, two radically different kinds of utterances. The constitu-
tional status of a merchant advertising his wares, of a paid lobbyist fight-
ing for the advantage of his client, is utterly different from that of a citi-
zen who is planning for the general welfare."30
A second major corollary to Meikeljohn's thesis concerns the scope of
permissible regulations within the category of public speech. While such
speech cannot be prohibited on the ground that it is "dangerous," it is not
on the other hand entirely free from any restriction whatever. Meiklejohn
claimed to take the practical view. His central image is the New England
town meeting, at which people "assembled, not primarily to talk, but pri-
marily by means of talking to get business done." Rules of procedure are
therefore necessary and under them a speaker could be declared "out of
order," to which it would be no valid response to assert a right to "talk as
he pleases, when he pleases, about what he pleases, about whom he
pleases, to whom he pleases." 31 The limitations on speech that Meiklejohn
would impose in the context of public decisionmaking arise from the gen-
eral principle that "the point of ultimate interest is not the words of the
speakers, but the minds of the hearers." Or, expressed in another form
that has been frequently quoted: "What is essential is not that everyone
shall speak, but that everything worth saying shall be said."3 The princi-
ple of free speech in this sense serves a "public" and not a "private"
interest.
These general elements of a theory of free speech seem quite insuffi-
cient to justify treating the essay as a major work. The basic idea, that a
democracy requires freedom of expression among the citizens, is, if not
obvious, then hardly original with Meiklejohn. One can find in the litera-
ture prior to Meiklejohn many similar justifications for the principle of
free speech.3" As to the corollaries, the first, that free speech protects only
29. As noted earlier, see supra p. 444, Meiklejohn subsequently gave this apparently severe limi-
tation on the scope of the First Amendment an expansive interpretation; nevertheless, Meiklejohn did
in theory keep all protected speech umbilically tied to the concept of self-government.
30. A. MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 8, at 37. The recently enunciated commercial speech doctrine
rejects Meiklejohn's relegation of commerical speech to Fifth Amendment protections. See Virginia
State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1976); Bigelow v.
Virginia, 421 U.S. 809 (1975).
31. A. MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 8, at 24-25.
32. Id. at 26.
33. Chafee himself observed that one of the two interests protected by the First Amendment,
besides the "individual interest, the need of many men to express their opinions on matters vital to
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public speech, has never really caught much attention, and for good rea-
son.34 The other, that free speech must be interpreted according to what
best serves the "collective" or "public" interest, again was hardly new
with Meiklejohn. That he was prepared to make this the only interest
advanced by the First Amendment may be of interest, but only marginally
so. On the score of originality, in sum, it would seem that Meiklejohn's
fame is quite undeserved.
On the level of rational argumentation, the essay is at best unsophistica-
ted. This is especially true of a series of arguments from the constitutional
text that Meiklejohn uses to support his theses. Meiklejohn argues, for
example, that no public speech, however dangerous, can be excluded from
public debate. He supports this position in part by making an exegetical
foray into the language of the Constitution. First, he notes that Article I,
section 6-the speech and debate clause-provides "uncompromising" and
"absolute" protection to the speech of our political representatives.3 5 Sec-
ond, he posits that under the theory of democracy, all rights and powers of
the representatives are merely "derivative" of the citizens. From the two
assertions, he concludes a fortiori that the same degree of protection for
speech accorded to representatives must also be accorded to citizens.
3 6
The argument is deficient on at least two grounds. First, it assumes
away the problem by proceeding on a debatable interpretation of Article I,
them if life is to be worth living," was the "social interest in the attainment of truth, so that the
country may not only adopt the wisest course of action but carry it out in the wisest way." Z.
CHAFEE, supra note 23, at 33. Brandeis said it more explicitly in his concurrence in Whitney: "Those
who won our independence believed that . . . freedom to think as you will and to speak as you think
are means indispensable to the discovery and spread of political truth; that without free speech and
assembly discussion would be futile." Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis, J.,
concurring).
34. See supra pp. 447-48.
35. Article I, section 6 of the Constitution states in relevant part that "for any Speech or Debate
in either House, [Senators and Representatives] shall not be questioned in any other Place." U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 6.
36. See A. MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 8, at 36. It appears that precisely this argument was made at
the beginning of the nineteenth century. Professor Levy describes a new argument for free speech
made by John Thomson in 1801:
He noted that Article One, Section Six, of the Constitution provided that members of Con-
gress "shall not be questioned," that is, held legally liable, for any speech they might make;
their remarks were clothed with an immunity that gave them the right to say whatever they
pleased in their legislative capacities. Thomson then reasoned that if freedom of discussion was
necessary for them, it was equally necessary, indeed more so, for their sovereigns, the people
whom they represented. The electorate must pass judgment on the proceedings of Congress
and insure that the government operated for the benefit of the government [sic]. For the fulfill-
ment of their electoral duties and their responsibility to protect themselves, the people could
not be denied access to any viewpoint. The agents of the people were accordingly powerless to
abridge the freedom of speech or press. The intention of the framers of the First Amendment,
Thomson concluded, was to guarantee that the people possessed "the same right of free discus-
sion" as their agents.
L. LEVY, THE LEGACY OF SUPPRESSION: FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND PRESS IN EARLY AMERICAN HIS-
TORY 296 (1963) (citing J. THOMSON, AN ENQUIRY, CONCERNING THE LIBERTY, AND LICENTIOUS-
NESS OF THE PRESS, AND THE UNCONTROULABLE NATURE OF THE HUMAN MIND 20, 22 (1801)).
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section 6. But more to the point and more problematic is the unexamined
assumption of a perfect equivalence between the speech protected under
that clause and speech protected under the First Amendment. It would
hardly seem self-evident that the framers believed that the scope of pro-
tected debate on the floor of the Congress would be precisely coextensive
with that throughout the country at large; indeed one interpretive stance
would be to draw precisely the opposite conclusion from the different lan-
guage employed in each section of the document. And, even apart from
what the framers intended, a good case could be made for not regarding
both provisions as coextensive. The nature of the process of selection for
those who will operate within the legislative arena and the types of people
who are likely to inhabit the congressional halls might lead one to tolerate
much greater freedom of discussion there than among the general popula-
tion, where indirect controls over irresponsible speech are far less exten-
sive. Only by ignoring the possibility of different degrees of concern about
legislative and public debate could Meiklejohn so facilely reach the con-
clusion that the First Amendment protects, for example, subversive speech
because it is coextensive with the speech and debate clause.
Nor would a view opposed to Meiklejohn necessarily negate the choice
to be "self-governing," since people continue to retain the right to elect
their representatives and to vote on issues of their choice. The problem is
one of determining the degree to which, under the Constitution, the gen-
eral society is to govern itself, or, to put the matter slightly differently, of
just how the process of self-government should be structured. In sum, the
difficulty is in defining and justifying what we mean by self-government
and why self-government excludes restrictions on political speech, a prob-
lem that Meiklejohn assumes away by this textual legerdemain."7
37. Meiklejohn also drew textual sustenance for his thesis from the wording of the due process
clause of the Fifth Amendment. U.S. CONST. amend. V (No person shall ...be deprived of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law . . . .). He reasoned as follows: (i) The language of
the First Amendment with respect to freedom of speech is an absolute prohibition against official or
governmental abridgement. U.S. CONST. amend. I (Congress shall make no law ... abridging the
freedom of speech . . . .). (ii) The Fifth Amendment permits the abridgement of liberty as long as it
is accomplished in a manner consistent with due process. (iii) The term liberty in the due process
clause includes speech. (iv) Since, therefore, the First Amendment forbids completely the abridgement
of freedom of speech, while the Fifth Amendment due process clause permits the abridgement of
speech, then one can conclude that the framers intended to divide speech into two classes. Those
classes are the "freedom of speech"-public speech of the "citizen who is planning for the general
welfare"-and the "liberty of speech"-the private speech of, for example, the "merchant advertising
his wares, of a paid lobbyist fighting for the advantage of his client." A. MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 8,
at 34-37.
A final textual argument is Meiklejohn's claim that the language of the First Amendment is itself
absolute with regard to the speech it protects. That speech, as we have seen, was to Meiklejohn the
public speech of planning for the general welfare. For a moment Meiklejohn considers whether the
clause of the First Amendment providing for the right to petition for redress of grievances indicates an
intent to protect a mere private interest, thereby reflecting a similar intent on the freedom of speech
clause. Meiklejohn, however, happily concludes that his interpretation is not thwarted since "such a
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Doubts about the magnitude of Meiklejohn's achievement, however, go
far beyond questions about his originality and skill at standard legal anal-
ysis. They go to the fundamental issue of whether what he has to say, or
has been interpreted as saying, has any real meaning for the world that
we inhabit. Confronting the two fundamental issues involved here will
move us onto another level of the essay's meaning.
The first issue is against whom or what does the First Amendment
provide protection. Meiklejohn's essay would hardly be memorable if it
were limited to the claim that the purpose of free speech is to keep the
"government" from interfering with the exercise of self-government by the
citizens. This would be a gross distortion of the reality of intolerance to-
ward speech, which arises not simply, or even primarily, from unautho-
rized official censorship but from democracy at work, from a majority de-
manding or wanting their government to prohibit certain forms of
expression from public discourse. To see this reality, however, is to pose a
major conundrum for free speech theory, especially a theory that justifies
free speech in terms of its contribution to the democratic system. For it
appears anomalous to restrict limitations on speech in the name of pre-
serving self-government when the self-governing process has generated
petition, whatever its motivation, raises definitely a question of public policy. It asserts an error in
public decision. . . . They ask, therefore, for reconsideration. And in doing so, they are clearly within
the field of public interest." Id. at 38.
These two other arguments similarly fail to lend a degree of textual inevitability to Meiklejohn's
claim for tolerance. He mistakenly assumes that the First Amendment necessarily takes a category of
speech, like political or public speech, and protects it absolutely. It certainly is true that the language
of the First Amendment means that whatever is protected is protected, but beyond this tautological
statement, nothing certain can be gleaned. While Meiklejohn does not commit the sophomoric error of
claiming that the wording of the First Amendment is absolute in the sense of protecting all speech (it
only protects against abridgement of the freedom of speech), he does make a partial error in that
direction by simply asserting without argument that the category of public speech is protected by the
First Amendment.
Meiklejohn next commits an error in reading the Fifth Amendment. Once he concludes that the due
process clause was intended to protect speech, he then jumps to the conclusion that the intent was to
create or divide speech or discussion into two categories, by their subject matter and context. As noted
above, it is not at all clear that the term "freedom of speech" in the First Amendment means only (or
even principally) public speech. Nor is that conclusion automatically reached by a negative inference
drawn from an interpretation of the Fifth Amendment as limited to private speech or discussion.
Meiklejohn leaps to the conclusion that because the Fifth Amendment also includes speech within its
protections, it must be a different category of speech than the category within the First Amendment.
But this need not be the case. It might just as easily be read as establishing only that the First
Amendment protects certain speech against abridgement and that speech not protected there is never-
theless subject to the Fifth Amendment protections of due process.
Meiklejohn's argument with respect to the wording of the First and Fifth Amendments is really
directed at his claim that there is a public-private distinction drawn there. But it does not follow that
any particular speech, and especially subversive speech, must fall within the public discussion cate-
gory. Thus, even if one grants Meiklejohn all of his inferences as to the categories protected by the
First and Fifth Amendments, there is still the critical question why particular speech should be pro-
tected as within the public speech category.
Meiklejohn therefore is really making two distinct arguments that he never fully separates: One has
to do with the categories of speech protected and not protected, and the other has to do with the
definitions of those categories.
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those very limitations.
Meiklejohn, of course, was conscious of this more complex facet of de-
mocracy. He was writing in the immediate postwar years, at the begin-
ning of the Cold War. This period bore a close parallel to the intolerant
climate during and immediately after the First World War, when Holmes
first dealt with the subject of free speech. In his preface, Meiklejohn spoke
to this reality of intolerance, noting how an extensive system of internal
security had been devised, with widespread public support to uncover
"un-American" and "disloyal" activities and agents. Referring to Federal
Bureau of Investigation activities, Meiklejohn said:
And that procedure reveals an attitude toward freedom of speech
which is widely held in the United States. Many of us are now con-
vinced that, under the Constitution, the government is justified in
bringing pressure to bear against the holding or expressing of beliefs
which are labeled dangerous. Congress, we think, may rightly
abridge the freedom of such beliefs.3 8
These were "wretched days of postwar and, it may be, of prewar, hys-
terical brutality." 9 The question to be answered, then, was should the
society refrain from employing legal coercion against these subversive
ideas, against those who would say that "the Constitution is a bad docu-
ment," "that war is not justified," "that conscription . . . is immoral and
unnecessary," "that the [political systems] of England or Russia or Ger-
many are superior to ours."' Even more pointedly, he asks, "[S]hall we
listen to ideas which . . . might destroy confidence in our form of govern-
ment," from those who "hate and despise freedom, to those who, if they
had the power, would destroy our institutions."' 1 Should we permit the
publication of Hitler's Mein Kampf, of Lenin's The State and the
Revolution, or of Engels' and Marx's Communist Manifesto?"2
But it is precisely the move to this more specific reality that gives rise to
the second apparent anomaly confronting Meiklejohn's thesis. The prob-
38. A. MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 8, at 4. Chafee noted the same disturbing trends:
This is a timely book. The country seems to be suffering again from an epidemic of hysteria
such as it underwent during the "Red Menace" of 1919-1920. Even men who recognize "that
the dangers from subversive organizations at the time of World War I were much exagger-
ated" are so apprehensive of the dangers from subversive organizations today that they are
once more seeking to fight objectionable ideas with long prison sentences and heavy pecuniary
penalties. If the First Amendment as construed by the Supreme Court prevents such suppres-
sion, then they propose to amend the First Amendment in order, so they say, "to preserve the
whole Constitution."
Chafee, Book Review, 62 HARV. L. REV. 891, 892 (1949).
39. A. MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 8, at 43.
40. Id. at 27-28.
41. Id. at 57.
42. See id. at 77.
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lem is not just in answering the general question, "What do you do when
the public has restricted speech through the democratic process?" but in
answering the further question, "Why protect this particular brand of
speech?" At the time Meiklejohn wrote, not only was there a form of self-
government actually at work, though perhaps not the one Meiklejohn
would have wanted, but the type of speech being excluded from the sys-
tem was that which allegedly directly challenged, or sought to undermine,
the system itself. Why should a theory of free speech, which envisions its
purpose as serving the system of self-government, lead to the conclusion
that a self-governing society cannot choose to prohibit speech which advo-
cates the end of self-government itself?43
A.
To put Meiklejohn's argument in broader context, it is helpful to pause
and consider what paths might be seen as open for a defense of free
speech. 44 One path is to claim the role of protecting the rights of minori-
ties within the political system, to assert their interests against a tyranni-
cal, however momentary, majority. Such an argument saves one from the
conundrum of serving democracy while defeating it, but only at serious
cost. As a practical matter, one might wonder how long a "right" that is
not defended as having any general societal purpose or value, apart from
serving the interests of a few members of the society, can survive. Such a
claim shatters any relationship other than that of brute power between the
legal system, the courts, and the larger society. This argument becomes
even more difficult to advance as the speech becomes more extremist in
character. And it is also shortsighted, for the thinking that motivated the
act of intolerance in this instance will most surely motivate other undesir-
able behavior in areas beyond the reach of the First Amendment, and
probably defeat whatever gains have been temporarily achieved by virtue
of the application of the First Amendment here.
43. Professor Bork concludes that under a theory of free speech that draws its importance from
the system of self-government, such speech cannot be protected:
Speech advocating forcible overthrow of the government contemplates a group less than a
majority seizing control of the monopoly power of the state when it cannot gain its ends
through speech and political activity. Speech advocating violent overthrow is thus not "political
speech" as that term must be defined by a Madisonian system of government. It is not political
speech because it violates constitutional truths about processes and because it is not aimed at a
new definition of political truth by a legislative majority. Violent overthrow of government
breaks the premises of our system concerning the ways in which truth is defined, and yet those
premises are the only reasons for protecting political speech. It follows that there is no consti-
tutional reason to protect speech advocating forcible overthrow.
Bork, supra note 10, at 31. Wigmore argued similarly in 1920. See Wigmore, Abrams v. U.S.: Free-
dom of Speech and Freedom of Thuggery in War-Time and Peace-Time, 14 ILL. L. REV. 539, 556-
57 (1920).
44. See Bollinger, supra note 26.
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An intermediate course is to claim for the free speech idea only the role
of an umpire who insures that every idea has a fair opportunity to become
a majority position. Under this argument, the principle of free speech
might be thought about with a more expanded temporal perspective:
While the present majority may have expressed its will in prohibiting this
speech, it cannot so alter the system as in effect to bind the future democ-
racy, which might find the censored ideas more to its liking. This seems to
be what Alexander Bickel had in mind when he said that "[t]he social
interest that the First Amendment vindicates is . . . the interest in the
successful operation of the political process, so that the country may better
be able to adopt the course of action that conforms to the wishes of the
greatest number, whether or not it is wise or is founded in truth."' 5 While
momentarily attractive, such a perspective does not withstand scrutiny. An
umpire issues judgments on rules made by others; the courts in the free
speech setting make the rules as they go along, and that is the source of
the problem. What speech is needed or relevant to the "process" and why
it is needed would still be unanswered questions.
A third route defends the enforcement of the free speech principle in
the face of a democratically arrived-at decision to the contrary as a prefer-
able choice for the society itself and the majority. The focus is not on the
protection of minorities against overreaching majorities, nor on the um-
pire's limited interference for the purpose of insuring a continuous oppor-
tunity for the formation of true majorities, but rather on a redefinition for
the majority of its own best interests. The concern is with the society at
large, of which the majority itself is a part.
A series of arguments, several of which may be called arguments of
expediency, cohere around this third approach. It is commonly said, for
example, that we are better off with protection because of the risks in-
volved in drawing lines-the perennial claim of the slippery slope."6 Or it
can be emphasized that we are all potential minorities. Or a safety valve
argument may be raised, claiming that we are better off by letting the
dissidents blow off steam vocally than through covert subversive activi-
ties.47 Or it can be said that we need not worry or bother because truth
45. A. BICKEL, supra note 11, at 62.
46. This is one of the more common varieties of First Amendment claims, vying for honors with
the related "chilling effect" argument as the most frequently used. It played an important role in the
most recent major "extremist speech" case, Village of Skokie v. National Socialist Party of Am., 69
I1l. 2d 605, 373 N.E.2d 21 (1978). I have commented on the argument in two contexts, one regarding
the Skokie cases and the other broadcast regulation. See Bollinger, supra note 26, at 623-24, 626-28;
Bollinger, Freedom of the Press and Public Access: Toward a Theory of Partial Regulation of the
Mass Media, 75 MICH. L. REV. 1, 31-32 (1976).
47. As Justice Brandeis wrote:
But they knew that order cannot be secured merely through fear of punishment for its infrac-
tion; that it is hazardous to discourage thought, hope and imagination; that fear breeds repres-
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will win in the end."' Finally, and more relevant to the present discussion,
we have the claim that we benefit from the act of listening to or tolerating
these people, hearing rather than suppressing the speech.
Within this last mentioned category of arguments we find principals
like John Stuart Mill, Holmes, and Meiklejohn. Mill, of course, argued
that it was in the interest of the majority to avoid suppression because the
ideas suppressed might be true, or, if not true, then sufficiently stimulat-
ing in their confrontation with the majority's beliefs to make toleration
worthwhile, if not mandatory.4 9
Quite clearly, Meiklejohn falls within the third approach; to him the
only legitimate function of free speech was the advancement of the public,
or collective, interest, not the realization of any private needs. But what
exactly is this collective interest served by the protection of speech? What
would the society gain by following such a course of action? It is either
inaccurate or too simple to suggest that Meiklejohn, like Mill, believed the
advantage would be a new truth or a more lively sense of existing truth.
And, despite his frequent claim that his was a practical, business-like ori-
entation to the First Amendment, Meiklejohn never really said what im-
portant information would be the payoff for the act of tolerance. Plausible
arguments might, of course, be imagined. It might be thought useful to
know what everyone is thinking within the society, especially those seg-
ments that are most likely to act destructively. Such data could conceivably
be helpful in organizing the society, distributing benefits, or identifying
and correcting problems. Or, a more limited argument might be that the
society has, through the act of suppression, effectively rendered itself inca-
pable of engaging in self-government since it no longer has the minimally
necessary information to make intelligent decisions. 50
sion; that repression breeds hate; that hate menaces stable government; that the path of safety
lies in the opportunity to discuss freely supposed grievances and proposed remedies; and that
the fitting remedy for evil counsels is good ones.
Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
48. The foremost expression of this view is in Milton's Areopagitica:
[T]hough all the windes of doctrin were let loose to play upon the earth, so Truth be in the
field, we do injuriously by licensing and prohibiting to misdoubt her strength. Let her and
Falshood grapple; who ever knew Truth put to the wors in a free and open encounter? Her
confuting is the best and surest suppressing.
J. MILTON, AREOPAGITICA 51-52 (J. Hales ed. 1961). Bickel said: "[W]e have lived through too
much to believe it." A. BICKEL, supra note 11, at 71.
49. J. MILL, ON LIBERTY 21 (C. Shields ed. 1956).
50. This argument is analogous to Mill's argument for prohibiting voluntary slavery. See id. at
125. If the state does not interfere with an individual's freedom to enslave himself, the individual may
use his valuable freedom to alienate that same freedom. Similarly, if the government is not restrained
in acting to prohibit speech, it alienates its ability to govern informedly. A similar argument has been
employed to justify extending First Amendment rights, especially to the press, under a self-govern-
ment theory of the First Amendment. Professor Dworkin discusses and rejects Justice Brennan's use
of such an argument in Richmond Newspapers.
The second argument, stressed particularly in Brennan's opinion . . . urges that some spe-
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But Meiklejohn never offered such arguments.51 Despite his early com-
ments on the function of free speech in getting the society's business done,
the progression of the essay is away from the pragmatic aspects of the
third approach until, by the next to the last chapter, he is speaking
broadly of basic intellectual values that are symbolized in the act of toler-
ance he sought. Here we find the essay's power: not in its logic, but in the
manner in which it characterizes the acts of tolerance and intolerance and
the images it evokes for each.
In Meiklejohn's terms, the act of toleration, especially of extremist
views, becomes a means by which the society communicates and affirms its
own principles. That these principles are contrary to those of the speaker
does not take away from the possibility of communication and affirmation;
this conflict instead creates the opportunity and actually enhances it. Tol-
erance in this way demonstrates, or proclaims, confidence in and commit-
ment to belief. It also bespeaks control, symbolized by the very theory of
free speech itself under which the right is tied to its usefulness to the
general society. Meiklejohn speaks in the language of "the citizens," "the
community," "the compact," "the general welfare," "the common good,"
and "fearlessness." 2 That people are not the way he would like is openly
acknowledged and partially forgiven, for it is also recognized that to
master self-governance as Meiklejohn would have it is most difficult. The
way is nevertheless clear, and it is the role of the Court to lead us there.
Meiklejohn believed in and advocated the possibility of complete self-
governance, of self-determination, whether for an individual or a group.
With groups, the state of self-governance was initiated by agreement or
cial protection for the press is necessary in order not simply to advance the general good but to
preserve the very structure of democracy. Madison's classic statement of this argument is often
cited in the briefs the press submits in constitutional cases. He said that "a popular govern-
ment, without popular information or the means of acquiring it, is but a prologue to a farce or
a tragedy; or perhaps both ... a people who mean to be their own governors, must arm
themselves with the power knowledge gives."
...But the Madisonian argument from the structure of democracy cannot be open-ended,
for then it will end in paradox and self-contradiction.
That is so because every extension of the First Amendment is, from the standpoint of de-
mocracy, a double-edged sword. It enhances democracy because public information increases
the general power of the public. But it also contracts democracy because any constitutional
right disables the popularly elected legislature from enacting some legislation it might other-
wise wish to enact, and this decreases the general power of the public ..
Dworkin, supra, note 15, at 53-54.
51. Meiklejohn did speak in highly general terms about the advantages of full information:
Now, in [a town meeting] method of political self-government, the point of ultimate interest is
not the words of the speakers, but the minds of the hearers. The final aim of the meeting is the
voting of wise decisions. The voters, therefore, must be made as wise as possible. The welfare
of the community requires that those who decide issues shall understand them. They must
know what they are voting about. And this, in turn, requires that so far as time allows, all
facts and interests relevant to the problem shall be fully and fairly presented to the meeting.
A. MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 8, at 26.
52. See id. at 14, 17-19, 42, 73-75.
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contract, such as those most commonly associated with the country's heri-
tage (the Mayflower Compact, the Declaration of Independence, the Con-
stitution).53 But, for Meiklejohn, the idea of self-government had a special
53. See id. at 17-18.
It was on the basis of an interpretation of Meiklejohn as arguing for the political and sovereign
right of democratic citizens to receive all information relevant to political issues that Professor Scanlon
constructed his broader theory of freedom of speech as constituting the protection of "individual au-
tonomy." See Scanlon, supra note 19. Basing his theory on what he called the "Millian Principle,"
Scanlon argued that certain "harms" could not "be taken as part of a justification for legal restric-
tions" on acts of expression:
These harms are: (a) harms to certain individuals which consist in their coming to have false
beliefs as a result of those acts of expression; (b) harmful consequences of acts performed as a
result of those acts of expression, where the connection between the acts of expression and the
subsequent harmful act consists merely in the fact that the acts of expression led the agents to
believe (or increased their tendency to believe) these acts to be worth performing.
Id. at 213. He subsequently described his objectives in the following terms:
I undertook to defend this principle by showing it to be a consequence of a particular idea
about the limits of legitimate political authority: namely that the legitimate powers of govern-
ment are limited to those that can be defended on grounds compatible with the autonomy of its
citizens-compatible, that is, with the idea that each citizen is sovereign in deciding what to
believe and in weighing reasons for action. This can be seen as a generalized version of
Meiklejohn's idea of the political responsibility of democratic citizens.
Scanlon, Freedom of Expression and Categories of Expression, 40 U. PrT. L. REV. 519, 531 (1979).
On reflection, however, he later felt compelled to abandon the theory as incorrect. Of primary concern
to him was the realization, or recognition, that the pursuit of being "autonomous," at least in the
sense of acquiring all relevant information needed for independent decisionmaking, or self-govern-
ment, was not an exclusive, or in some instances even a primary, end of human life:
Additional information is sometimes not worth the cost of getting it. The Millian Principle
allows some of the costs of free expression to be weighed against its benefits, but holds that two
important classes of costs must be ignored. Why should we be willing to bear unlimited costs
to allow expression to flourish . . . ?
Id. at 533.
Professor Scanlon continues to believe that fundamental human interests are at stake both in the act
of expression and in having access to expression (audience interests) and argues in favor of a generally
strong level of protection for certain "categories" of expression, especially "political" expression, on
the ground that "where political issues are involved governments are notoriously partisan and unrelia-
ble. Therefore, giving government the authority to make policy by balancing interests in such cases
presents a serious threat to particularly important participant and audience interests." Id. at 544.
I do not wish here to engage in a lengthy discussion of this line of theory about free speech, but
Scanlon's arguments are importantly instructive in a number of respects. I agree with Scanlon's in-
sightful self-criticism. A central problem with theories about the "values" we derive from being free to
speak and to listen to speech we like is that they tend to be overstated in terms of actual life experi-
ence. To say that with free speech we are seeking to implement our desire for total "autonomy" as
sovereign individuals is to exhibit a unidimensional perspective or singlemindedness about the ends of
life that is unrealistic. As Scanlon realized, life experience demonstrates that we regularly take other
competing interests into account in situations in which access to information is at issue. Furthermore,
the sense that our "autonomy" is being infringed upon by a given restriction on access to information
is importantly affected by the process by which that restriction is adopted. The notion of an alien
"government" or "state" passing the restrictions helps create a sense of invasion; thinking in terms of
a true "democratic" decision lessens that feeling.
On the other hand, it is possible to see in the protection of speech not simply the pursuit of some
universal and exclusive value-like "autonomy" of decisionmaking-but also the attempt to identify
and correct some perceived defect in our attitudes. One must still make the claim that this is some-
thing one ought to or does want corrected, but one does avoid the problem of having to demonstrate
that human behavior consistently adheres to a single end or interest. Furthermore, the discussion in
the text attempts to show that Meiklejohn did not rest his argument for free speech on the ground of a
universal interest in being "self-governing" but rather in a perceived lack of interest in being in that
position, seeing in that perceived deficiency a general way of thinking he found unsatisfactory.
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meaning, a value that was independent of the particular governmental
choices or decisions arrived at. To exist under the power of a perfectly
governed regime would mean losing the satisfactions, the dignity, of being
capable of self-control.
To be self-governing, as Meiklejohn would have it, however, could not
include all possible outcomes of self-government. An individual or society
could not claim to be self-governing if it decided, even unanimously, not to
consider or hear a particular idea, and especially not if the reason behind
the exclusion or suppression was that the idea was determined to be hate-
ful, frightening, or wrong. The child who "decides" to flee an imagined
ghost does not possess self-control. Control comes only with the mastery of
such fears, and that is why Meiklejohn could say that "[t]o be afraid of
ideas, any idea, is to be unfit for self-government." 5" The essence of self-
governance is the willingness to confront every idea, everything that is
being said; it is the absence of censorship. Meiklejohn acknowledged that
people are very much inclined to take the opposite direction; we would all
just as soon not be self-governing in this sense.
55
And so, the problem was not one simply of keeping a constantly en-
croaching government from stealing back political power from a weaker
or perhaps unsuspecting populace, but of stopping the people themselves
from giving up a role, or a capacity, from which their natural tendencies
make them want to stray. The problem was not simply seditious libel, but
the far more difficult challenge of creating the democratic personality. The
role of the courts, and especially of the Supreme Court, in this ongoing
process was that of the educator, or teacher. Meiklejohn described the
purpose of his own lectures as that of educating the public about the "ba-
sic plan" of American government. But, to him, the Supreme Court was
our foremost "teacher" on that subject: "The Supreme Court, we have
said, is and must be one of our most effective teachers. It is, in the last
resort, an accredited interpreter to us of our own intentions." '56
Meiklejohn's argument, therefore, assumes an equivalence between the
state of being self-governed and the absence of censorship. The end sought
was not merely wise decisions, but a personal capacity achieved through
the search for those decisions. The language employed gives hints of this
deeper value. To exclude some speech or ideas from public discourse is to
be "fearful," "insecure," "ignorant," "unfit for self-government," to
"flinch." But to tolerate them is to "face up to ideas," to be "fearless,"
54. A. MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 8, at 28.
55. Id. at 10.
56. Id. at 51. A question of obvious significance that I do not address in this Article is that of the
legitimacy or capacity of the judiciary to articulate intellectual values, which as I suggest, Meiklejohn,
Holmes, and others were in fact doing.
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"unflinching," and otherwise "self-reliant." 5
Meiklejohn went further, however. Within this specially defined capac-
ity of self-government, he insisted upon a broadly conceived system of in-
tellectual values. Self-governance was not just facing up to every idea,
however wrong or dangerous it might be regarded, to be followed by a
single count of noses. In particular, it was emphatically not a matter of
each citizen merely figuring out what was "good for him" and then voting
on that basis. For Meiklejohn, true self-government was conducted ac-
cording to an intellectual standard by which every citizen thinks and votes
in terms beyond himself, objectively, and in pursuit of the general, collec-
tive welfare.58 To Meiklejohn, beliefs could be assessed as good or bad,
true or false, and part of the capacity we seek is to be better able to render
judgments about them. Some beliefs were true, and one of the functions of
the First Amendment was to make possible the communication of truths
by those who had it to those who did not.59 Meiklejohn himself gave the
impression of a man who believed he possessed the truth about the right
kind of community values.
Thus, with Meiklejohn, the First Amendment embodies an intellectual
life in the broadest sense, one to which we aspire under the tutelege of the
Supreme Court. The First Amendment recommends to us a set of intellec-
tual values that speaks to the unsatisfying and dwarfing character of cen-
sorship, that identifies what is relevant for political decisionmaking and
that explains how we should think about what is relevant. Here, then, are
the answers to the double paradox. There is no contradiction in overturn-
ing censorship arrived at by majority (or even unanimous) vote, for that is
not and cannot be true self-government; it is not what we ought to mean
by self-government. Self-government in this sense means not only the ab-
sence of censorship but also a set of attitudes about how each member of
57. Meiklejohn spoke repeatedly of the need for protection of radical speech, and whenever he did
so his argument shifted from the need for information to the possibility of fearlessness:
If, then, on any occasion in the United States it is allowable to say that the Constitution is a
good document it is equally allowable, in that situation, to say that the Constitution is a bad
document. If a public building may be used in which to say, in time of war, that the war is
justified, then the same building may be used in which to say that it is not justified ....
These conflicting views may be expressed, must be expressed, not because they are valid, but
because they are relevant. If they are responsibly entertained by anyone, we, the voters, need to
hear them. When a question of policy is "before the house," free men choose to meet it not
with their eyes shut, but with their eyes open. To be afraid of ideas, any idea, is to be unfit for
self-government.
Id. at 27-28 (emphasis added).
Praising Brandeis' remarks in Whitney, Meiklejohn adds, "We Americans are not afraid of ideas,
of any idea, if only we can have a fair chance to think about it." Id. at 48; see also id. at 77 ("We are
saying that the citizens of the United States will be fit to govern themselves under their own institu-
tions only if they have faced squarely and fearlessly everything that can be said in favor of these
institutions, everything that can be said against them.").
58. Id. at 73-75.
59. Id. at 74-75.
The Yale Law Journal
the community should relate to every other member.
The other portion of the paradox concerns the extent of the principle of
self-government: why it makes sense to insist upon tolerance for those who
would advocate destruction of the system itself, however defined. Under
Meiklejohn's argument, the anomaly is only apparent. One can envision
at least two functions served by tolerance in such a case, both of which
can be seen as implicit in the general argument. The first relates to the
pedagogical role the Court assumes under the aegis of free speech. The
instructional advantages of extremes are, of course, well known and no
doubt did not escape the intuitive attention of an educator like
Meiklejohn. The drama and tension of aberrant* behavior has, at a mini-
mum, an attention-commanding capacity, which somewhat ironically
means that the system can beat the radicals at their own game. But there
is a deeper, more substantive gain from tolerance.
For it is extremeness itself, and the very fears evoked by it, that make
tolerance of free speech mandatory under a regime like Meiklejohn's. To
a society that seeks to develop a certain capacity, especially one of security
and control, toleration can help to establish or prove symbolically the arri-
val of that capacity. Often, the harder something is to do the more sym-
bolic meaning the doing of it carries. For speech that attacks and chal-
lenges community values, the act of toleration serves both to define and
reaffirm those values; the act of tolerance implies a contrary belief, and
demonstrates a confidence and security in the correctness of the commu-
nity norm. Through toleration, in short, we create the community, define
the values of that community and affirm a commitment to and confidence
in those values. To think of freedom of speech in this way evokes Seneca's
prescription on mercy-its primary value, when implemented by the
ruler, is in what it bespeaks of the party who is merciful, his confidence
and security and self-restraint in the face of challenges to that authority."'
60. Seneca wrote:
Every house that mercy enters she will render peaceful and happy, but in the palace she is
more wonderful, in that she is rarer. For what is more remarkable than that he whose anger
nothing can withstand, to whose sentence, too heavy though it be, even the victims bow the
head, whom, if he is very greatly incensed, no one will venture to gainsay, nay, even to en-
treat-that this man should lay a restraining hand upon himself, and use his power to better
and more peaceful ends when he reflects, "Any one can violate the law to kill, none but I, to
save"? A lofty spirit befits a lofty station, and if it does not rise to the level of its station and
even stand above it, the other, too, is dragged downward to the ground. Moreover, the peculiar
marks of a lofty spirit are mildness and composure, and the lofty disregard of injustice and
wrongs.. . . Cruel and inexorable anger is not seemly for a king, for thus he does not rise
much above the other man, toward whose own level he descends by being angry at him. But if
he grants life, if he grants position to those who have imperilled and deserve to lose them, he
does what none but a sovereign may; for one may take the life even of a superior, but not give
it ever except to an inferior.
I Seneca, On Mercy, in MORAL ESSAYS 356, 371-73 (J. Basore trans. 1970).
Another defense of freedom of expression that fits into this general strain of argumentation, though
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B.
To understand Meiklejohn's argument helps to point up, by contrast,
that of Holmes, whose intellectual values, while no less universal in char-
acter and no less implicated in his defense of free speech than those of
Meiklejohn, were nonetheless strikingly different. Meiklejohn properly
sensed the difference, though he seemed throughout much of the essay to
be confused about the real point of disagreement. Many had attacked
Holmes, and his principal defender, Chafee, for harboring too great an
attraction for free speech. But no one, until Meiklejohn, had really at-
tacked the intellectual framework that underlay Holmes' defense of free
speech.
Meiklejohn had difficulty, however, in locating the true conflict between
himself and Holmes. He spent too much time denouncing Holmes for the
clear and present danger test, which Meiklejohn seemed to misunderstand.
He bridled at the suggestion that whenever speech became dangerous, the
government could intervene and call a halt to further discussion. Purport-
ing to be an advocate of an "absolute" standard for public expression,
Meiklejohn appeared to stand for a more rigid level of protection. But the
difference was more apparent than real: Meiklejohn was able to distance
himself from Holmes only by exaggerating the actual meaning of the clear
and present danger test, by making no allowance for the shift in Holmes'
thought in the years between Schenck"' and Whitney, 2 and by failing to
acknowledge the flexibility inherent in his own "absolute" standard. By
the end of the discussion, which begins with a severe castigation of
Holmes and his test, Meiklejohn is basically in agreement with the refor-
mulation of the clear and present danger test that Brandeis announced in
Whitney (with, of course, Holmes' concurrence)."3 Thus, one is left puz-
zled as to why Holmes is the "villain of the piece," when the only fault
finally attributed to him is that he had earlier announced an overly broad
principle, which, though it took him a few years to do so, he did ulti-
mately get right. Even if it were true that "the great majority of [Holmes']
colleagues were taking very seriously the assertion of Mr. Holmes that
whenever any utterance creates clear and present danger to the public
it is virtually always lumped together with other dissimilar defenses, is that attributed to Thomas
Jefferson: "If there be any among us who would wish to dissolve this Union or to change its republi-
can form, let them stand undisturbed as monuments of the safety with which error of opinion may be
tolerated where reason is left free to combat it." Jefferson, First Inaugural Address (March 4, 1801),
reprinted in THE COMPLETE JEFFERSON 384, 385 (S. Padover ed. 1943). Toleration becomes
proof-a "monument"-of one's confidence, security, and authority.
61 Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919).
62. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357 (1927).
63. See A. MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 8, at 48.
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safety, that utterance may be forbidden and punished,"64 it seems quite
unfair to lay all the blame on Holmes, all the more so when it is conceded
that "[n]o one, of course, believes that this is what Mr. Holmes intended
. ..to say" and that Holmes "spoke out with insistent passion" as his
colleagues misinterpreted and misapplied his unfortunate test.
5
This nondispute is representative of a good deal of misdirection in free
speech argument. Like so much of the debate over the utility and meaning
of the clear and present danger test and the so-called "absolute" standard,
one comes away from these vigorous exchanges puzzled by what the fury
is all about. Meiklejohn's tussle with Holmes suggests that what appears
on the surface as vigorous disagreement over tests and standards is often
only a superficial disagreement actually motivated by deeper and more
fundamental disagreements about basic intellectual values.
A more careful reading of Meiklejohn is therefore required to under-
stand the real and profound differences between him and Holmes. The
disagreement centers not on whether or not to protect certain speech, but
on the issue of the "moral and intellectual foundations of a self-governing
society."6 Meiklejohn's commitment to and confidence in community val-
ues run squarely into Holmes' proclamations of ultimate relativism in
human affairs. The dispute is about basic intellectual values, which in-
form the recommendation of tolerance in each instance.
Holmes' writings on the First Amendment reflects his well-known
skepticism.67 The clearest and most celebrated of these statements is in his
Abrams dissent, where he addressed the "logical" impulse to intolerance:
Persecution for the expression of opinions seems to me perfectly logi-
64. See id. at 45-46.
65. See id. at 46.
66. See id. at 61.
67. For a more extended analysis of Holmes' legal attitudes in general, see Rogat, The Judge as
Spectator, 31 U. CHI. L. REV. 213 (1964). Professor Rogat portrays Holmes as "detached," "disen-
gaged," and without concern for the way of life he believed in. "To a remarkable degree," Rogat
writes, "Holmes simply did not care." Id. at 255. He would "bow to the way of the world," because
his view was that power lay at the root of human affairs and power was not negotiable. Rogat
presents this picture as a contrast to the common view of Holmes as "sceptical" and "humble." "He
may have said that nothing was true once and for all, but on any particular occasion in making any
particular decision he was convinced that he was right." Id. at 251. His acquiescence, his fatalism, his
detachment, and his lack of caring are what led him to perform his judicial functions as he did with
such tolerance.
What I am saying here in one sense conflicts with Professor Rogat's description and in another
sense does not. It seems possible for someone like Holmes to believe quite deeply in the truth of his
beliefs and yet to assume a position of tolerance towards contrary beliefs while still "caring" about his
own beliefs. It is certainly possible for a person to feel the intensity of belief and simultaneously think
that it is folly to feel that way, to recommend to oneself and to others that the preferable course is that
which is contrary to one's nature. The problem may lie in the ambiguity of the idea of skepticism.
There are people who appear to believe virtually nothing quite easily, and there are also people who
believe most fervently and yet realize that those inclinations are without rational foundation and try
on that basis to modulate them.
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cal. If you have no doubt of your premises or your power and want a
certain result with all your heart you naturally express your wishes
in law and sweep away all opposition. To allow opposition by
speech seems to indicate that you think the speech impotent, as when
a man says that he has squared the circle, or that you do not care
whole-heartedly for the result, or that you doubt either your power
or your premises. But when men have realized that time has upset
many fighting faiths, they may come to believe even more than they
believe the very foundations of their own conduct that the ultimate
good desired is better reached by free trade in ideas-that the best
test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the
competition of the market, and that truth is the only ground upon
which their wishes safely can be carried out.6
Like so many of Holmes' remarks, this quotation has a strange mix of
bluntness and ambiguity. While it appears to affirm the possibility of
"truth" in human affairs, it does so by foreclosing any meaningful role for
the individual other than as a component in a larger marketplace. It in-
structs us that wanting to believe in the truth of our beliefs is a natural
aspect of the human condition, but urges us to overcome that tendency. So
many "fighting faiths" have come to nought, it is said, that it is inadvisa-
ble to accept the validity of anything we happen to believe at the moment.
We had best put our faith in the outcome of the market, a secular ana-
logue of the comforting illusion of prior centuries that the king spoke with
divine authority.
Ultimately, the intellectual posture advocated by Holmes was as encom-
passing as that offered by Meiklejohn, though fundamentally at odds with
it. For both men, the protection of extreme speech took on special mean-
ing. While Meiklejohn viewed tolerance as an affirmation of belief,
Holmes viewed it as a necessary consequence of self-doubt. For Holmes,
the more unbelievable the idea, the more the capacity for self-doubt was
tested.
The intellectual posture of Holmes has been strikingly reinforced in
recent years by Professor Gunther's publication of an exchange of letters
during the Schenck 9 -Abrams70 period between Holmes and Judge
Learned Hand, who appeared to share much of Holmes' intellectual out-
look.71 Responding to a letter by Hand in which Hand declares that
"Tolerance is the twin of Incredulity," Holmes writes that he "agree[s]
with it throughout." In the course of the letter he describes himself as
68. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
69. Sehenek v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919).
70. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616 (1919).
71. Gunther, Learned Hand and the Origins of Modern First Amendment Doctrine: Some Frag-
ments of History, 27 STAN. L. REV. 719 (1975).
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being committed intellectually to a course of self-doubt, however unsuc-
cessful the effort to fulfill that commitment: "When I say a thing is true I
mean that I can't help believing it-and nothing more. But as I observe
that the Cosmos is not always limited by my Cant Helps I don't bother
about absolute truth or even inquire whether there is such a thing, but
define the Truth as the system of my limitations." 2
Meiklejohn detected the intellectual ethic of relativism in Holmes' claim
for free speech and perceived some of its implications. He found in
Holmes' view "no adequate account of the deeper social ends and ideas
upon which the legal procedure depends for life and meaning." He saw
Holmes' attitude as "representative . . .of his time and country," a state
of mind that Meiklejohn argued was culturally debilitating. Importantly,
he saw a connection between the attitudes embodied in the principle of
free speech and the attitudes people generally bear. And so he charged
that Holmes' relativism had contributed to an excessive "individualism" in
the country, and worse, an "intellectual irresponsibility" where "private
interest" is given free reign under the rationalization that the "competi-
tion of the market" will shed the bad and save the good. It was a license
to forego the burdens of intellectual effort and objective truth for the sim-
pler and attractive path of self-preference."3
The conflict over the meaning of free speech between Meiklejohn and
Holmes was rooted in a shared effort to develop a capacity reflected in the
act of tolerance, but for one it was the capacity of shared belief and com-
munity, while for the other it was the capacity of self-doubt and individu-
alism. One theory was centripetal, the other centrifugal.
II.
In the foregoing discussion, I have attempted to identify the conflicting
intellectual values underlying two of our major theoretical accounts of free
speech. At the risk of being excessively reductionist, I have suggested that
the difference between Meiklejohn and Holmes is that for one tolerance
constitutes the affirmation of a belief or set of beliefs and for the other
tolerance is acknowledgement of self-doubt or relativism. For both, the
legal concept of free speech provides an opportunity to instill or create a
particular intellectual outlook. The activity of speech itself is not the end
to be secured, but rather the reformation of perceived undesirable intellec-
tual tendencies and the substitution of other tendencies.
Reduced to these terms, this dispute can be found replicated elsewhere
in the classic free speech literature. This is, for example, the basic division
72. Id. at 757.
73. See A. MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 8, at 73-74.
Vol. 92: 438, 1983
Free Speech
in argument that Mill uses in constructing his plea for liberty of speech.
His question is this: Should one think of one's beliefs as "true," but nev-
ertheless be tolerant of the expression of untruths, or should one think of
them as potentially untrue and proceed to justify tolerance on that basis?
Despite the inconsistency of the two premises for a free speech theory,
Mill advanced both as alternative grounds. More recently, one finds this
tension between competing bases for tolerance reproduced in Bickel's last
book, The Morality of Consent,74 where the argument vacillates between
a plea for a Burkean acceptance of life without universal truths and a
recognition of the destructiveness of relativism and the corresponding need
for deeply embedded community values.
Neither defense of tolerance, I would contend, provides an acceptable or
stable foundation for free speech. I return to Meiklejohn and Holmes to
demonstrate the proposition. Both are doomed to fail because what each
offers is unacceptably extreme as a general intellectual posture and, with
respect to the actual functioning of free speech, is built upon an internal
contradiction. Each presents a vision that is appealing but dangerously
partial.
Consider Meiklejohn. He presents an attractive vision of the self-gov-
erning community, modeled on an idealized New England town meeting
where people carry on under a set of shared values that includes a belief
in the capacity for self-control (self-determination) and a belief in the
spirit of cooperative striving for the general interest. It would be comfort-
ing to know what you believed, to be confident of the bases and reasons
for your belief, and to feel in control of your capacity to recreate the envi-
ronment to correspond to those beliefs. But such a world can itself be
undermined by speech. Meiklejohn says it is a function of the First
Amendment to let those members of the community who have arrived at a
"truth" communicate it to others. But suppose they do so and it is not
received by others as a truth at all, but as a falsehoood? In a self-gov-
erning society, people then face a dilemma when they believe deeply in the
truth of some idea, yet others do not appear to share the same feeling.
Meiklejohn himself reveals the fragility of a position of tolerance consti-
tuted on a foundation of right belief. At the very end of the essay, he rues
the lack of opportunity to apply his theory to concrete examples of the
limits of free speech. He finds it "essential, however, to mention one typi-
cal failure [of our national education] which, since it has to do with the
agencies of communication, falls within the field of our inquiry." The
"failure" is "commercial radio." Here was a "new form of communica-
tion" that had "opened up before us the possibility that, as a people living
74. A. BICKEL, supra note 11, at 3-30.
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a common life under a common agreement, we might communicate with
one another freely with regard to the values, the opportunities, the diffi-
culties, the joys and sorrows, the hopes and fears, the plans and purposes,
of that common life." Perhaps, he says, "amid all our differences, we
might become a community of mutual understanding and of shared
interests.
'7 5
"But never was a human hope more bitterly disappointed." While in
the beginning it deserved the protection of the First Amendment, it was
not "entitled" to it now. Why not? Because "[i]t is engaged in making
money." Radio "is not cultivating those qualities of taste, of reasoned
judgment, of integrity, of loyalty, of mutual understanding upon which
the enterprise of self-government depends. On the contrary, it is a mighty
force for breaking them down. It corrupts both our morals and our
intelligence."7 6
Here in one surprising passage, Meiklejohn reveals the limits of the
concept of the "right to hear," of the notion that free speech means that
we are not "afraid" of dangerous ideas, that "to be afraid of any ideas,
any idea, is to be unfit for self government. '7 7 In the end, according to
Meiklejohn, we cannot afford to tolerate all forms of "subversive" speech,
but only those forms that are not really dangerous because the vast major-
ity already dislike them. In the quest for values through enforced tolera-
tion, the values can so easily end up taking precedence over the idea of
toleration itself. As with Rousseau's famous turnabout on the meaning of
civil religion, Meiklejohn's "public interest" notions become subtly trans-
muted into a justification for suppression.
But the alternative of self-doubt bears its own seeds of instability. It
moves easily (as Meiklejohn said) into a posture of nihilism and self-inter-
est that erodes social cohesion.7 Yet its problems as a foundation for free
speech are even more fundamental. Perhaps the individual can tenably
accept toleration on the conviction that nothing is true, but his actions
become much less defensible when he employs the power of the state to
inhibit others from being intolerant. In this instance, the individual is de-
manding an intellectual outlook of self-doubt from those who wish to in-
sist on belief. The question may properly be asked why the belief that
75. A. MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 8, at 86-87.
76. Id. at 87.
77. Id. at 28.
78. Professor Bickel wrote:
This is the point at which one asks whether the best test of the idea of proletarian dictatorship,
or segregation, or genocide is really the marketplace, whether our experience has not taught us
that even such ideas can get themselves accepted there, and that a marketplace without rules of
civil discourse is no marketplace of ideas, but a bullring.
A. BICKEL, supra note 11, at 76-77.
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"the ultimate good desired is better reached by free trade in ideas" should
not be subjected to the same self-critical realization that "time has upset
many fighting faiths." If we are better off permitting the "play of forces"
and supremacy through "free competition," then why should the same
evolutionary process not play itself out in the arena of speech as well?
The attitude reflected in these rhetorical questions can be found in
Holmes' early free speech decisions, like Schenck, where tolerance is ex-
pressed as the need for judicial acceptance of a nation driven to intoler-
ance by war-generated passionate convictions of true belief." I find it a
more congenial hypothesis that Holmes' dramatic change of position on
free speech between Schenck and Abrams was not merely an unsuccessful
strategy employed in Schenck to get a good test at the expense of affirming
a conviction, or the result of an interim education in the merits of free
speech, but rather was the natural, perhaps inevitable, shifting about on a
position premised on the sands of relativism and self-doubt.8"
It is clear that Holmes was himself uncertain about the appropriate
implications to be drawn from acknowledgment of a relativistic universe.
In a letter to Judge Hand discussing his thoughts before "the statue of
Garrison on Commonwealth Avenue, Boston," Holmes says that if he
were "an official person I should say nothing shall induce me to do honor
to a man who broke the fundamental condition of social life by bidding
the very structure of society perish rather than he not have his
way-Expressed in terms of morals, to be sure, but still, his way." As the
"son of Garrison," alternatively, he should find himself thinking differ-
ently, taking the view that "every great reform has seemed to threaten the
structure of society,-but that society has not perished, because man is a
social animal, and with every turn falls into a new pattern like the Kalei-
doscope." As a philosopher, however, he would believe them to be "[f]ools
79. "When a nation is at war many things that might be said in time of peace are such a hin-
drance to its effort that their utterance will not be endured so long as men fight and that no Court
could regard them as protected by any constitutional right." Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52
(1919).
80. See Gunther, supra note 71, at 719; Chafee, supra note 38, at 900-01.
It is worth noting here that Learned Hand seems to have developed a similar turnabout in his
lifetime on the matter of judicial enforcement of free speech protection for radical expression, just as
Holmes did. The only difference is that his reversal of position went the opposite way from that of
Holmes. Hand began as a fervent supporter of liberal free speech doctrine with his well-known deci-
sion in Masses Publishing Co. v. Patten, 244 F. 535 (S.D.N.Y.), rev'd, 246 F. 24 (2d Cir. 1917),
from which the so-called "incitement test" was derived, but ended up striking a very conservative
posture with his opinion in United States v. Dennis, 183 F.2d 201 (2d Cir. 1950), al'd, 341 U.S. 494
(1951)-a view of free speech he embraced personally in his 1958 Holmes Lectures, see L. HAND,
THE BILL OF RIGHTS (1958), in which (in Professor Gunther's characterization) he viewed "the first
amendment as one of a set of moral adjurations, not as a judicially enforceable norm," Gunther, supra
note 71, at 752. What is especially interesting is that "Hand and Holmes shared a common philo-
sophical outlook," which included a disbelief "in absolutes or eternal truths" and a commitment to
"skepticism." Id. at 732-33. To Hand, "Tolerance is the twin of Incredulity," id. at 736, and "our
chief enemies are Credulity and his brother Intolerance." Id. at 766.
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both, not to see that you are the two blades (conservative and radical) of
the shears that cut out the future." But, it is the "ironical man in the back
of the philosopher's head" who is given the last word, saying of the phi-
losopher that he was the "[g]reatest fool of all" for not seeing that "man's
destiny is to fight" and urging him to "take thy place on the one side or
the other, if with the added grace of knowing that the Enemy is as good a
man as thou, so much the better, but kill him if thou Canst."' Holmes
himself could only embrace his own skepticism with misgiving and doubt.
III.
We can agree with Kalven that at its core the First Amendment prohib-
its the government from severing a democratic relationship with the citi-
zenry by instituting a regime of seditious libel. And New York Times Co.
v. Sullivan is a case that evokes this kind of First Amendment im-
agery-even if the reality was quite distant from it. But the securing of
that victory did not complete the role to be played by the First Amend-
ment. It only initiated it. For the idea of free speech, at least as it has
come to be known in this century, addresses far broader questions: It
speaks to the intellectual make-up and character of the society.
As such, free speech is a far more complex enterprise than preventing
governmental interference in the democratic process, maximizing the flow
of data, or protecting the rights of speech for minorities against tyrannical
majorities. Meiklejohn and Holmes offer competing intellectual bases for
free speech. Each proves unacceptably limited. To broaden the inquiry
into the role of free speech as a forum for defining certain fundamental
intellectual values is to begin to build a foundation from which we can
better evaluate our previous experience with the concept and perhaps even
develop a more coherent and stable general theory.
One might, for example, reconsider the differences between two cases
such as Sullivan and Cohen. Is the primary difference that Sullivan de-
fines free speech in terms of seditious libel, offering a systemic vision in
which the discussions of the citizens are protected by the courts against
governmental hindrance, while Cohen defines it more in terms of a
speaker's right to self-fulfillment? I think not. The most important differ-
ences between those two major opinions is in the intellectual attitudes that
each suggests, both implicitly and explicitly.
In Sullivan, the Court was fundamentally in sympathy with the mes-
sage of the speech at issue. Indeed, this message of racial equality was one
that the Court itself had fostered in the face of severe criticism. First, the
Court offered encouragement for speech and its use for promoting beliefs.
81. Id. at 757.
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The Court began with the "profound national commitment to the princi-
ple that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-
open,"82 words that in context conveyed the tone of support for dissent.
This theme was then developed with an apologia for belief's natural ten-
dency toward excess. The Court quoted an earlier decision where it was
said of religious and political views that "[t]o persuade others to his own
point of view, the pleader, as we know, at times, resorts to exaggeration,
to vilification of men who have been, or are, prominent in church or state,
and even to false statement."83 The notion that the prerogatives of belief
must be respected was then restated at the end of the analysis-and with
new meaning-with a description of the Court's own posture of self-re-
straint in the face of harsh criticism. The "concern for the dignity and
reputation of the courts," the Court had held, "does 'not justify the pun-
ishment as criminal contempt of criticism of the judge or his decision,"
even if the "utterance contains 'half-truths' and 'misinformation.' "84 This
is because judges "are to be treated as 'men of fortitude, able to thrive in a
hardy climate . . ",85 The suggestion is not that speech is a rich source
of potential ideas, or that criticism might be helpful in arriving at the
correct result, but rather that speech is something to be tolerated with
"fortitude." The overtones are again ones of firmness of conviction, and
they converge with the earlier sympathetic explanation in the opinion
about the particular speech challenged in the case. In the end, Sullivan is
an opinion that defines tolerance in terms of the encouragement and affir-
mation of belief.
The Court in Cohen8 also explored how communication or speech ac-
tivity ought to be regarded, though there the context was the more tradi-
tional one in which the Court itself disagreed with the particular exercise
of speech at issue. The opening sentence of the opinion unambigiously
stated that though "[t]his case may seem at first blush too inconsequential
to find its way into our books, . . . the issue it presents is of no small
constitutional significance." ' This intimation that there had been an
abuse of a right was gradually made plain, first as Harlan refrained from
restating Cohen's slogan and then as he heaped scorn through elegant
paraphrase ("the inutility or immorality of the draft"88) and finally, more
explicitly, when he labeled the speech as a "distasteful mode of expres-
82. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964).
83. Id. at 271 (quoting Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 310 (1940)).
84. Id. at 272-73 (citations omitted).
85. Id. at 273 (quoting Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367, 376 (1947)).
86. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1970).
87. Id. at 15.
88. Id. at 18.
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sion,"89 "a crude form of protest," 90 and a "trifling and annoying instance
of individual distasteful abuse of a privilege."""
Having thus characterized the speech activity, the question then be-
came how to vindicate its toleration. As with Sullivan, the messages were
mixed. On the one hand, it was said that this seeming "verbal cacophony
is not a sign of weakness but of strength."9 But, the final judgment is
more skeptical than anything encountered in Sullivan: The speech could
not be excised because "while the particular four-letter word being liti-
gated here is perhaps more distasteful than most others of its genre, it is
nevertheless often true that one man's vulgarity is another's lyric.", 3 Co-
hen arose, in the end, more from Holmes' intellectual perspective. The
activity was distasteful, but Harlan was reluctant to coerce on the basis of
his aesthetic predilections.
This discussion is not intended to be a definitive interpretation of either
decision, but only an illustration of the way in which we might assess the
impact and message of particular cases and thus establish a critical per-
spective. Beyond that, however, we might also begin to develop a better
and more viable theory of what free speech ought to do. Everyday experi-
ence tells us that discussion can enhance our knowledge and understand-
ing of the world, and of the political realm too, and that to express oneself
is at a certain level an elemental need of the personality. To agree with
these assertions, however, does not take us far in answering the questions:
Why has the society singled out the activity of speech for such special
attention and held the community to what can only be regarded as an
extreme position of self-restraint and tolerance? To say that speech is use-
ful and important is a beginning, but it hardly begins to account for what
is done in fact in the name of free speech.
Answers to these basic questions emerge from the preceding discussion
about the writings of Meiklejohn and Holmes, and I would like to con-
clude with a brief outline of how those answers can provide a foundation
for a free speech theory. In doing so, let us continue working with the
concept of free speech as concerned with the "process" of social decision-
making. The intellectual history of the idea of free speech in this century
has been dominated by this concept and, as I have suggested, the concept
has serious deficiencies. The idea of free speech has often been coupled
with the disingenuous notion that courts are only protecting that process
from government intervention while, in fact, they have intruded into it.
89. Id. at 21.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 25.
92. Id. (emphasis added.)
93. Id.
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The idea has been tied excessively to the process of political decisionmak-
ing instead of being envisioned more broadly as encompassing decision-
making on all social values. And the idea has been narrowly conceived as
concerned only with the maximization and distribution of information in-
stead of with the qualitative issues of what I have referred to here as
intellectual values. But, despite these deficiencies, there remains something
powerfully attractive and worthwhile in thinking about free speech as an
institution where the way in which social issues are addressed and re-
solved is itself considered.
This way of thinking about free speech does not, however, help to ac-
count for why speech is treated differently from other conduct when issues
of social organization are raised. The common view is to claim that speech
is properly singled out for special protection because it is uniquely valua-
ble as a means of conveying necessary information for social decisionmak-
ing. Such an answer, however, proves inadequate. An interest in acquir-
ing relevant information cuts far more broadly through human activity,
encompassing nonspeech conduct as well as speech. Indeed, the recent
movement in free speech jurisprudence to recognize a right to gather in-
formation is itself premised on a belief that nonspeech conduct is vitally
related to the acquisition and distribution of relevant information. The
conventional justification, moreover, loses its integrity as speech becomes
more extreme in character, as the social harm reasonably thought to arise
from it increases. I agree with those who have objected to the argument
that all that has been done in the name of free speech is justified by its
informational value, and I do not believe that either Holmes or
Meiklejohn saw the justification for toleration in those limited terms. At
some point, speech becomes simply a matter of human behavior like any
other, all of which is open to processes of social decisionmaking. And at
that point, what can be the justification for further exempting speech be-
havior from the process?
An answer rests on the earlier discussion about the character, or quali-
ty, of social decisionmaking, and about the intellectual values that are said
to be important to it. Meiklejohn and Holmes were responding not to
some single-minded urge for information but to the perceived need to cor-
rect what might be thought of as a bias or deficiency in the way people
think about issues when engaged in the social process. Such a bias could
be found in social decisionmaking about every issue, whether it concerns
the limits of speech or nonspeech conduct. But, it is the area of speech that
has been seized as presenting the opportunity for identifying and address-
ing that deficiency. Since under either Meiklejohn's or Holmes' view, this
deficiency in social discourse manifests itself in a tendency to excessive
intolerance of speech, speech must be treated as a portion of behavior that
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is excluded from the social decisionmaking process. Toleration must be
pushed to an extreme, as a kind of opportunity to point up and address
what is in fact a broader problem. In an important sense, then, it can be
said that free speech has gone beyond process in an attempt to shape the
nature of that process. Free speech becomes a concept under which an
area of social organization is effectively carved out and rendered immune,
not for its uniquely important role in assisting decisionmaking, but as a
way of pressing for an intellectual capacity or perspective that is also
thought to be of direct value elsewhere.
It is important to recognize the significance of the change in orientation
involved in this way of looking at free speech. The writings of Holmes
and Meiklejohn are representative of an extremely important but gener-
ally unnoticed shift in perspective on the meaning and function of the free
speech principle. No longer is the premise of the discussion about free
speech the assumed need to secure "our" liberty to speak freely against
some "other" antagonistic political body or power. The center of focus has
shifted away from the purpose of establishing an unrestricted zone of lib-
erty in which we can fulfill "our" interests to speak and to hear the infor-
mation and ideas we value-what Isaiah Berlin referred to as the idea of
"negative liberty" 94-towards the purpose of creating a zone of unregu-
lated behavior against which "we" can test and develop a general charac-
ter of mind through confrontation with that behavior-what may be
thought of as the goal of exploring the virtues of tolerance. In a sense, this
latter ambition or aspiration can itself be thought of as a variation of that
ambiguous concept "liberty"; indeed, it seems to resemble what Berlin
classified as the notion of "positive liberty", that is, the "wish on the part
of the individual to be his own master." According to Berlin, the mastery
sought may be over "external forces" or over irrational passions and im-
pulses internal to the individual or community.95 In envisioning these two
divergent components of the concept of liberty, Berlin worried about the
94. I. BERLIN, Two Concepts of Liberty, in FOUR ESSAYS ON LIBERTY 118, 122-31 (1969).
95. Id. at 131. The primary discussion of "positive freedom" appears at 131-134. It is also inter-
esting to note in this context that one can detect in Meiklejohn's arguments for toleration, as I have
described them, the use of what Berlin referred to as the "search for status." Id. at 154-162. This
particular desire in human beings for "status," Berlin argued was something distinguishable from the
concept of freedom or liberty:
It is something no less profoundly needed and passionately fought for by human beings-it is
something akin to, but not itself, freedom; although it entails negative freedom for the entire
group, it is more closely related to solidarity, fraternity, mutual understanding, need for associ-
ation on equal terms, all of which are sometimes-but misleadingly-called social freedom.
Id. at 158. The need for fraternity and status, Berlin contended, had frequently led in human affairs
to the curtailment of true liberty, though it was often confused with the idea of liberty or placed under
the liberty banner. But with Meiklejohn we see how the tapping of the desire for community and
fraternity and equality of status can be the rallying call for toleration as well as for revolution, or for
submission to tyranny.
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positive conception being turned into a source of oppression, a concern to
which the discussion here lends weight. What he did not see, however, is
how the two conceptions of negative and positive freedom could be yoked
together, the former in service to the latter; how the establishment of a
zone or field of "negative" freedom could become a source or method of
striving for some sense of "positive" liberty. Brandeis actually gave hints
of it many years ago in Whitney, where amidst a litany of possibilities
about the meaning and function of free speech he wrote: "Men feared
witches and burnt women. It is the function of speech to free men from
the bondage of irrational fears." '
To be sure, we are still left with a number of important questions. Is
such a view of the functions of free speech justified? Is defining and at-
tempting to encourage the development of intellectual values a proper role
for courts to play? Does one's talk of intellectual values push beyond the
boundaries of the notion of process and determine substance and outcome?
Are the assumptions about the nature of mind correct? How far and in
what ways do the perceived problems in the intellectual make-up of peo-
ple cut through the activities of society? What are the intellectual values
we should be seeking?
I do not possess a clear set of answers to these questions and I shall
leave them for another time. I do not know, for instance, how to define in
a paragraph the intellectual values that ought to inform our social deci-
sionmaking. I do think, however, that a stance of relativism or of right
belief, even when coupled with tolerance, will not provide a satisfactory
foundation.
But, these remaining difficulties ought not to obscure the importance of
the more fundamental observations about the functions of free speech,
which provides a structure for inquiry. Free speech is a social context in
which basic intellectual values are developed and articulated, where as-
sumptions about undesirable intellectual traits are offered and remedies
proffered. Both Meiklejohn and Holmes spoke to these issues. Though I
have argued that both ultimately failed in their efforts to define a set of
intellectual values for society througl free speech, the failure in each case
was only partial and due to the universality each sought for his own
paradigm.
96. Whitney v. California, 247 U.S. 357, 376 (Brandeis, J., concurring).
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